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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Is corporate leverage excessive? Is the tax code distorting corporate capi-
tal structure decisions in a way that increases the possibility of an eco-
nomic crisis owing to "financial instability"?
Answering these kinds of questions first requires some precision in
terminology. In this paper, we describe the cases for and against the
trend toward high leverage, and evaluate the role played by taxation.
While provision of proper incentives to managers may in part underlie
the trend to the debt, high leverage may in practice be a blunt way to
address the problem, and one which opens up the possibility for undue
exposure to the risks of financial distress.
Our story takes as given the kinds of managerial incentive problems
deemed important by advocates of leverage. We maintain, however,
that when a firm is subject to business cycle risk as well as individual
We are grateful to Rosanne Altshuler, Ben Bernanke, Larry Summers, and participants at
the 1989 NBER conference on Tax Policy and the Economy for helpful comments and
suggestions.44 Gertler & Hubbard
risk, the best financial arrangement is not simple debt, but rather a
contract with mixed debt and equity features. That is, the contract
should index the principal obligation to aggregate and/or industry-level
economic conditions.
We argue that the tax system encourages corporations to absorb more
business-cycle risk than they would otherwise. It does so in two re-
spects: first, it provides a relative subsidy to debt finance; second, it
restricts debt for tax purposes from indexing the principal to common
disturbances. At a deeper level, the issue hinges on the institutional
aspects of debt renegotiation. If renegotiation were costless, then debt
implicitly would have the equity features relevant for responding to
business cycle risk. However, because of the diffuse ownership pattern
of much of the newly issued debt and also because of certain legal
restrictions, renegotiation is likely to be a costly activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Is corporate leverage excessive? Is the tax code distorting corporate capi-
tal structure decisions in a way that increases the possibility of an eco-
nomic crisis owing to "financial instability"?
Answering these kinds of questions first requires some precision in
terminology. We refer to a firm as having "excessive leverage" or a
"debt overhang problem" when the magnitude of the principal obliga-
tion on the debt it is carrying constrains either the amounts it can invest,
produce, or employ. In this regard, the business press regularly records
fears of the consequences of high leverage.
1 The sharp rise in corporate
debt (and debt-service burdens) over the last six years has sparked this
concern. The alarm has also spread among circles in the academic
community.
On the other hand, the discussions have rarely been precise about
how high debt levels could have bad effects on economic activity. Nor
has it been made clear why, if high leverage is so dangerous, the private
market economy has generated this kind of situation. Finally, there has
been an emerging school of thought, led by Jensen (1986, 1988, 1989),
which rejects the idea that current leverage is excessive. Instead, it views
the current corporate financial situation as simply an efficient market
outcome. The efficiency argument rests on the idea that high leverage
may provide lenders with a means to restrict indirectly non-value-
maximizing behavior by corporate managers.
1 See, for example, Anise C. Wallace, "Time for jitters in the junk bond market," New York
Times, August 6, 1989.Taxation and Financial Distress 45
In this paper, we describe the cases for and against the trend toward
high leverage, and evaluate the role played by taxation. While provision
of proper incentives to managers may in part underlie the trend to debt,
high leverage may in practice be a very blunt way to address the prob-
lem, and one which opens up the possibility for undue exposure to the
risks of financial distress. We argue that the tax system deserves at least
some of the blame for a capital structure that does not optimally shield
corporations from the consequences of an economic downturn.
Our story takes as given the existence of the kinds of managerial
incentive problems deemed important by the advocates of high lever-
age. We maintain, however, that when a firm is subject to business-cycle
risk as well as individual risk, the best financial arrangement is not
simple debt, but rather a contract with mixed debt and equity features.
In particular, the arrangement should insulate lenders as much as possi-
ble from firm-specific risks but have them share in systemic risks. That
is, the contract should index the principal obligation to aggregate and/or
industry-level economic conditions. The rough idea is to minimize the
impact of a recession on firm net financial positions, as we discuss later
in detail.
We proceed to argue that, on the surface, the tax system encourages
corporations to absorb more business-cycle risk than they would other-
wise. It does so in two respects: First, it provides a relative subsidy to
debt finance: second, it restricts debt for tax purposes from indexing the
principal to common disturbances. At a deeper level, the issue hinges on
the institutional aspects of debt renegotiation. If renegotiation were cost-
less, then debt implicitly would have the equity features relevant for
responding to business-cycle risk. However, because of the diffuse own-
ership pattern of much of the newly issued debt and also because of
certain legal restrictions, renegotiation is likely to be a far from costless
activity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II sum-
marizes the facts regarding the recent rise in corporate leverage. Section
III reviews the main arguments over whether high leverage should be
cause for alarm. It describes the benefits of leverage as a corporate con-
trol mechanism and the possible costs involved, in terms of raising the
possibility of financial distress. This section also addresses the role of
taxes in the debate and describes how taxes may distort the capital-
structure decision.
Section IV presents some rough evidence regarding the magnitude of
the relative tax subsidy to debt. Whether the "new debt" is easy to
renegotiate—that is, whether it is effectively equity—is taken up in
Section V. Section VI outlines the issues for tax reform using the guiding46 Gertler & Hubbard
premise that taxation should not distort corporate capital structure. Fi-
nally, Section VII provides some concluding remarks.
II. DEBT AND RECENT CORPORATE
FINANCING PATTERNS
The trend to high leverage is relatively new. Over the entire postwar
period, equity finance was dominant. For non-financial corporations,
retained earnings accounted for roughly 73 percent of funds raised and
net new share issues added another 2 percent. Debt provided the bal-
ance, divided about equally between private issues (e.g., bank loans and
private placements) and public issues (e.g., bonds). Table 1 summarizes
this evidence.
Financing patterns altered course during the 1980s. While corpora-
tions continue to rely heavily on retained earnings, they have sharply
adjusted the composition of external finance. Most notably, there have
been substantial equity repurchases, financed mainly with debt (see,
e.g., Shoven, 1987). That is, leverage ratios have risen mainly as the
product of corporate capital restructurings. Net new equity issues to-
taled -$131 billion in 1988, as compared to +$25 billion five years
earlier.
An important effect of the shift to debt has been a substantial rise in
debt-service burdens, and an associated rise in bankruptcies and de-
faults. Interest payments per dollar of earnings (before interest and
taxes) have risen from 16 cents over the postwar period prior to 1970 to
33 cents over the 1970s to an average of 56 cents over the 1980s. Alterna-
tively, interest payments per dollar of cash flow have increased from
about 10 cents in the pre-1970 period to about 35 cents over the 1980s.
This increase in debt-service burdens (documented in Figure 1) has been
accompanied by an increase in corporate bankruptcies and liabilities of
business failures over the 1980s. While there has been a cyclical pattern
of bankruptcies over the postwar period, bankruptcies have been high
(relative to postwar standards) throughout the boom following the
1981-1982 recession (see Figure 2).
2 There is, as well, an impression that
larger firms are defaulting on debt obligations (and failing) relative to
earlier periods.
3
2 This increase in bankruptcies raises the question of why bankruptcy costs would be
incurred—that is, why renegotiation of financial contracts has not been more effective. We
will return to this point repeatedly.
3 See, for example, Alison Leigh Cowan, "Rescuing business is now a big business," New
York Times, October 5, 1989.Taxation and Financial Distress 47
TABLE 1
Corporate Financing from Internal and External Sources, 1946-1988























































































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, various issues; and
MacKie-Mason (1989).
As suggested, an important factor underlying the trend to debt has
been a dramatic rise in corporate restructurings. Prompting the restruc-
turings have been waves of mergers, acquisitions, leveraged buyouts
(LBOs), and defense against LBOs. These restructurings have been par-
ticularly significant in raising debt-equity ratios. According to First Bos-
ton Corporation (1989, p. 27), the average capital structure of an LBO in
1988 included 87 percent debt (divided among bank debt, 53 percent;
coupon debt, 20 percent; and deferred-interest obligations) and only 13
percent equity (divided between common, 10 percent; and preferred, 348 Gertler & Hubbard
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FIGURE 1. Interest payments relative to corporate earnings
(1946-1988)
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percent). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reported that,
by the end of 1988, outstanding LBO debt was roughly $150-180 billion.
This amounted to about 20 percent of the (book) value of outstanding
corporate bonds or over 9 percent of the (book) value of total non-
financial corporate debt (based on data from the Flow of Funds Ac-
counts). In comparison, from 1978 to 1983, debt emerging from LBO
deals was only about $11 billion.
The trend to debt, however, encompasses more than just LBOs. Gold-
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shrunk by about $420 billion between 1982 and 1988, and that debt
supplanted about three-fourths of this reduction. (Financial Market Per-
spectives, 1988, p. 5).
Another important change in corporate financial policy involved the
kind of debt issued. Private debt issues have declined in relative impor-
tance. The trend is toward public issues, particularly low grade invest-
ments bonds, known popularly as "junk bonds." While junk bonds
existed well before the 1980s, widespread use of them has been a rela-
tively sudden event. Seventy percent of outstanding issues (as of the
end of 1988) are from the last three years, with 20 percent from 1988
alone (First Boston Corporation, 1989, p. 30).
There is no clear consensus on why the junk bond market grew so
dramatically. Many observers, though, tend to agree that the develop-
ment of the secondary market for junk debt (as part of the general trend
toward "securitization") was an important factor. This innovation, it is
argued, provided junk bonds with the kind of liquidity needed to induce
lenders to absorb them on a large scale.
4 An added implication was that
it made diffuse ownership of a firm's junk debt possible, and even
likely. Thus, along with the general rise in leverage, the 1980s also
witnessed a change in the kind of debt issued by corporations—toward
debt that involved a more "arms length" relation with bondholders and
away from debt, such as bank loans, that permitted a more intimate
connection (see Bernanke and Campbell, 1988).
How have junk bonds been faring? After a strong initial performance,
total returns on major high-yield funds have fallen significantly in recent
years (see Table 2). And for the first half of 1989, the portfolio of high-
yield issues reported by Moody's Bond Survey (July 17,1989, p. 5110) had
a total return of 5.8 percent versus 11.4 percent for investment-grade
bonds—despite the large default premia built into coupon rates.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED
CORPORATE LEVERAGE, AND THE ROLE OF
TAXATION
The case in favor of current trends rests on the idea that the private
market is well suited to generate the most efficient kind of corporate
4 The corporate debt "puzzle" is always couched in terms of explaining why current
leverage is high. Placed in historical context, an alternative puzzle is why corporate lever-
age was so low in the 1950s and 1960s (see, for example, Taggart, 1985). The idea that
financial innovation was important in the recent development of the junk bond market
provides (at least part) of a consistent explanation of both phenomena.50 Gertler & Hubbard
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Note: Returns include price appreciation and reinvestment of capital gains and income dividends.
Source: Lipper Analytical Services.
organization. The case against argues instead that high leverage exposes
the economy inordinately to the risks of a severe business downturn; tax
considerations rather than pure efficiency considerations, it is held,
primarily drive the movement to debt. In this section we first present
both sides of the issue and then conclude by discussing the role of taxes.
IIIA. Benefits of Leverage: Debt as an Incentive
Mechanism
Those who are sanguine about the rise in leverage typically maintain
that debt is desirable because it empowers lenders with an indirect
means to monitor the activities of managers. The need for some kind of
supervision owes to the separation between ownership and manage-
ment that is characteristic of the traditional corporate structure. As Berle
and Means (1932) originally described, a conflict between owner-
ship and management can emerge if it is difficult for the former to
observe and evaluate the activities of the latter. In this kind of environ-
ment, management's self interest may not always coincide with effi-
ciently operating the firm (i.e., with maximizing firm value).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formalized this potential for divergence of
interests as an "agency problem." Their work and subsequent by others
characterized the efficiency losses ("agency costs") that can arise in this
environment. An important insight was that financial contracts could be
structured to mitigate the problem. Another was that the managerial
stake in the enterprise (the managerial equity) was key: the higher the
managerial stake, the closer the gap between managerial interests and
value maximization, and hence the lower agency costs. Advocates of
increased leverage interpret the recent wave of LBOs in this light. The
restructurings improved managerial incentives both by converting theTaxation and Financial Distress 51
claims of lenders from equity to debt and by concentrating ownership in
the hands of management (i.e., by raising the managerial stake).
But why is high leverage the right course? And perhaps more impor-
tant, why was the movement to high leverage so recent? In general, the
efficient financial structure depends on the exact nature of the conflict
between ownership and management. For a wide class of situations, it is
optimal to make the managers bear as much of the firm-specific risk as
possible, the goal being to have managers internalize the gains from
maximizing firm value.
5 Debt contracts represent an approximate (some-
times exact) way to implement this kind of solution. By promising lend-
ers a fixed stream of payments, the contract effectively ties managerial
rewards closely to the performance of the firm.
6'
7
The idea that debt is a way to properly align managerial incentives is
at the core of Jensen's (1986) "free cash flow" theory, perhaps the most
prominent explanation for the trend to leverage. The story begins with
the idea that managers, if given the leeway, will take advantage of
outside lenders' inability to ascertain perfectly whether the firm is in-
vesting efficiently. Specifically, managers are inclined to squander cash
flow by investing for their own aggrandizement in projects with a nega-
tive present value. An arrangement where outside lenders hold debt
and managers are the residual claimants is a way to minimize this kind
of misuse of cash flow.
8
The Jensen story also offers some additional insight into why the rise
in debt occurred so recently, beyond the conventional story that empha-
sizes innovation in the secondary market for junk debt. It is observed
that (i) high cash flow arises primarily in mature industries, and that (ii)
the maturing of American industry in the postwar era began only over
the last decade. As a result, the argument goes, the widespread need for
corporate restructurings is relatively new (see, for example, Blair and
Litan, 1989).
This set of arguments contains some loopholes, however. While
5 Grossman and Hart (1982), for example, show how high debt levels can limit a manager's
consumption of prerequisites when firm investment is not easily monitored.
6 Hall (1988) characterizes these kinds of contracts as "back to the wall," because of the
position in which they place management.
7 One countervailing factor is that the combination of debt finance and limited liability can
induce lenders to invest in overly risky projects, if lenders cannot directly monitor invest-
ments. In this kind of situation, equity contracts may be optimal.
8 The value of insiders' stakes for aligning incentives has long been stressed by such
practitioners as KKR. Recent accounts have pointed out the role of low insiders' stakes in
the failure of the Seaman leveraged buyout. See, for example, Stuart Flack, "See you in
bankruptcy court," Forbes, October 16, 1989, pp. 77-80.52 Gertler & Hubbard
leveraging the firm may be a way to mitigate the kind of agency problem
Jensen describes, it is not immediately obvious that it is the best option.
If the objective is to make managers bear the residual risk, then it would
seem that other practical means are available. One possibility is to adopt
a fixed dividend policy with penalties for management if it fails to meet
the payment. If these kinds of alternatives are available,
9 then it appears
difficult to explain the debt build-up simply as a response to an emerg-
ing agency problem. Tax considerations have likely played a role. If,
however, the tax distortion is key, then it is not at all clear that high
leverage is the most efficient form of financial organization.
As a matter of theory, high leverage is a very blunt way to align
managerial incentives. It works best when most of the variation in cash
flow is idiosyncratic to the firm—i.e., when most of the risk is "firm-
specific." It works poorly when most of the variation is common across
firms, to the extent that debt is costly to renegotiate. The optimal re-
sponse to the kind of agency problem posed by Jensen insulates lenders
as much as possible from the firm-specific risk, but has them share in the
common risk. The idea is that managers should be made residual claim-
ants only on the component of profits they can influence—the firm-
specific component. For example, managers should not be punished if
the firm does poorly during a recession but no worse on average than its
competitors. Indeed, to preserve managerial equity—which is valuable
for mitigating agency costs—outside lenders should share in the losses
to the firm due to an industry-wide or economy-wide recession.
The overall message is that the optimal financial arrangement should
link payments to creditors to industry and economy-wide performance
(e.g., as would a contract with mixed debt and equity features). Further,
because it is desirable to have the outside lenders share in the gains and
the losses due to systemic factors, the arrangement is not equivalent to
allowing merely for postponement of payment without any adjustment
in the present value of the principal obligation. Standard debt contracts
do not provide the flexibility needed for sharing of common risks. The
9 Another theoretical possibility is to tie managerial compensation to firm performance,
i.e., to use managerial salary rather than capital structure to align incentives. This possibil-
ity may be limited in practice, however, by the "business judgment" rule which protects
management from liability mistakes of judgment in shareholder challenges in court—as
long as management stakes are low (see Gilson, 1986). Yet another alternative in principle
is to have the board of directors actively monitor the managers. However, many commen-
tators have lamented the generally weak oversight role provided by outside directors, a
role not enhanced by the generally small stake of directors in the firm (see, for example,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Similarly, institutional restrictions on banks in the U.S. pre-
clude them from undertaking the kind of extended ongoing monitoring of corporate
borrowers that, for example, Japanese banks are free to perform (see Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharf stein, 1989).Taxation and Financial Distress 53
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Sources: The categories and calculations are taken from First Boston Corporation (1989, p. 20) and from
unpublished Drexel Burnham Lambert data reported in David Zigas and Larry Light, "Don't Put Away
the Smelling Salts Yet," Business Week, October 2, 1989, pp. 92-93.
advocates of high leverage, however, argue that most debt is easy to
renegotiate in practice and, therefore, is implicitly indexed to systemic
risks. Whether in fact they are right about renegotiation is perhaps the
pivotal question. We will return to this issue frequently.
IIIB. Costs of Leverage: Debt and Financial Stability
A wide spectrum of economists (e.g., Friedman, 1986; and Kaufman,
1986) have voiced concern that corporate restructurings have exposed
the economy unduly to the risk of a financial crisis. Ratios of interest
obligations to cash flow are at non-recession record highs (see Bernanke
and Campbell, 1988). The general fear expressed is that an otherwise
normal business downturn could trigger a large wave of bankruptcies,
turning the recession into a severe business downturn. This fear is based
on the presumption that highly leveraged transactions have occurred in
cyclical as well as acyclical industries.
Indeed, a good fraction of the high-yield debt has been issued in
manufacturing, a cyclically sensitive industry. Table 3 reports the break-54 Gertler & Hubbard
down of high-yield debt (as of the end of 1988) by industry of issue,
using data provided by Drexel Burnham Lambert and First Boston Cor-
poration. Based on the First Boston data, depending on how one allo-
cates the components of the "energy" group between manufacturing
and extractive activities, about one-half of the stock of high-yield debt is
attributable to manufacturing firms. Similarly, the first five categories in
the Drexel enumeration (heavy industry, retailing, leisure, transporta-
tion, and consumer goods) which are arguably (relatively) cyclical, ac-
count for 57 percent of high-yield debt outstanding.
To put the matter in sharper perspective, Bernanke and Campbell
considered the counterfactual experiment of imposing the 1974-1975
business recession on a sample of firms with financial conditions corre-
sponding to 1986 data. The sample was drawn from the Compustat file,
and therefore consisted primarily of large firms. The simulations implied
that a downturn like 1974-1975 would force more than 10 percent of the
sampled firms into bankruptcy.
Any argument that high debt levels are dangerous, however, requires
qualification. The institutional structure of the economy is critical.
Leverage ratios for non-financial corporations are much higher in West
Germany and Japan than in the U.S., for example. The critical difference
is that, in these countries, the financial institutions that supply debt
typically participate in or monitor closely the activities of the firm. (This
is particularly true for Japan—see Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein,
1989—and for Germany—see Berglof, 1988, and Mayer, 1989.) The close
connection between the firm and its major creditor facilitates renegotia-
tion. It thus provides (at least some) of the flexibility needed for adjust-
ing to macroeconomic disturbances. It also serves to directly mitigate the
agency problem since the lending institution actively monitors the firm.
On the other hand, as Jensen (1988) observes, legal restrictions in-
troduced in the wake of the Depression preclude U.S. financial institu-
tions from directly participating in the activities of nonfinancial
corporations. The U.S. system of corporate finance is thus closer to one
of diffuse ownership with an arms-length relationship between the firm
and its creditors. Further, as implied earlier, the substitution of junk




It is also true that the quantity of debt a firm issues must be measured
against the quality of its underlying collateral, including the managerial
1
0 While it is true that banks hold (at least initially) the majority of the senior debt in a
highly leveraged restructuring, it is also true that the Comptroller of the Currency has
urged them to restrict their holdings to a minimum (see Brancato, 1989).Taxation and Financial Distress 55
equity. Perfectly collateralized debt poses no threat, for example. In a
less extreme situation, the collateral position is key to evaluating the
dangers the firm may face in the event it cannot meet its current interest
obligation (but is otherwise solvent for the long term). A firm with a
strong position will find it relatively easy to obtain credit to offset the
shortfall in its cash flow. One with a weak position is likely to experience
the costs of financial distress—suspension of credit flows entailing the
need for substantial retrenchment in employment and investment.
1
1
(For a detailed account of this type of experience, see the description of
the Texaco-Pennzoil case in Cutler and Summers, 1988.)
Overall, for the U.S. economy, high debt levels are dangerous to the
extent that collateral positions are weak for a significant fraction of cor-
porations and that provisions (either explicit or implicit) do not exist for
adjusting the obligations to common risks.
1
2 The absence of comprehen-
sive indexing permits destabilizing movements in managerial equity.
Forcing the corporation to meet fixed interest obligations in a prolonged
recession can deplete managerial equity (to the extent managers are the
ultimate residual claimants) which in turn can send the company into
financial distress. Similarly, non-contingent debt exposes the economy
to the risk of unanticipated wealth redistributions that can have adverse
effects. For example, the deflation during the Great Depression wiped
out a good fraction of the collateral base of non-financial corporations,
which had issued liabilities fixed in nominal terms.
There are some corollary factors also suggesting that high debt levels
make the economy particularly vulnerable to a recession. One consider-
ation involves the nature of bankruptcy laws in the U.S. These regula-
tions place severe restrictions on the activities of firms in default, thus
adding to the real costs of financial distress (again, see Cutler and Sum-
mers, 1988). The cumulative effect of a wave of bankruptcies could
greatly exacerbate a downturn. And concern for the potential of wide-
spread defaults does not seem misplaced. Asquith, Mullins, and Wolff
(1989) have noted that the default rate on junk debt has been rising,
despite the economy's having been in a prolonged expansion;
specifically, there has been a rise in cumulative default probabilities for
the first several years after issue. In addition, the rated quality of the
debt has declined.
1
1 Bernanke and Gertler (forthcoming) emphasize that borrower net worth is likely to be
important in the renegotiation process.
1
2 The idea that borrower net worth, rather than debt per se, is fundamentally key to
financial stability is present in a number of recent studies. See, for example, Bernanke and
Gertler (forthcoming); Calomiris and Hubbard (1990); and the review of studies in Gertler
and Hubbard (1988).56 Gertler & Hubbard
Two other factors involve external effects. First, a kind of "contagion
effect" is possible; the default of a large firm or group of large firms can
induce panic among lenders, precipitating a liquidity crisis. An example
is the near collapse of commercial paper market in the wake of the Penn
Central crisis. News of the impending Penn Central default generated
fears of defaults by other firms, prompting a flight of funds out of the
commercial paper market (see Brimmer, 1988). Similar effects occurred
in the municipal bond market after the WHPPS default; and Hirtle (1988)
describes how the LTV default (in July 1986) and the outbreak of the
Boesky scandal (in November 1986) had adverse consequences on prices
and liquidity of junk bonds.
1
3 Second, to the extent that there are de-
mand externalities (due, for example, to imperfect competition), the
effects of financial distress can spread throughout the economy. In this
kind of setting, a downturn in a financially troubled sector can spill over
to other sectors (see Cooper and John, 1988, for a discussion of the
macroeconomic effects of demand externalities).
IIIC. The Role of Taxes
As we have noted, (in our view) the cause for concern over high lever-
age rests on the premise that it limits the ability of corporations to
optimally share industry and economy-wide risks with outside lenders.
To the extent there is a tax incentive encouraging the use of debt relative
to equity, it is relevant to consider how the tax system fits into the
overall picture.
Ideally, corporations would like to issue securities they could label as
"debt" which permitted the legally required principal obligation to vary,
perhaps by introducing contingencies on a set of observable indicators.
In this way, they could collect the tax benefits from debt finance without
sacrificing any flexibility in adjusting to common disturbances. More
generally, if allowed the option, firms would like to relabel for tax pur-
poses equity as debt. The spirit of the tax code, at least, precludes this
kind of activity. The IRS has generally required that any instrument
called debt for tax reasons have a payoff which is "sum certain," (e.g.,
see the review of cases in Bulow, Summers, and Summers, 1989).
1
4
Writing a debt contract which either explicitly or implicitly indexes the
principal payment to common disturbances violates (at least) the intent
of the tax code.
1
3 Another example, occurring very recently (September 1989), is the response of the high-
yield debt market to Campeau's troubles.
1
4 In principle, the Secretary of the Treasury can define "debt" for tax purposes, as a result
of Congress's addition in 1969 of Section 385 to the Internal Revenue Code. The regula-
tions are administratively complex, however.Taxation and Financial Distress 57
It is true that IRS accepts as debt securities which permit interest to be
deferred. The recently introduced "payment in kind" bonds are an ex-
ample. However, these securities meet the "sum certain" requirement
because they do not explicitly allow for adjustment of the principal
obligation. Thus, at least on the surface, they are not useful instruments
for sharing common risks.
There is, accordingly, reason to suspect that the current tax system
encourages corporations to adopt a financial structure more exposed to
common cyclical risks than would be the case in the absence of any
subsidy to debt. In Gertler and Hubbard (1989), we sharpen this point.
We study a model of firm investment behavior where the kind of incen-
tive problem deemed important by Jensen is present. Because of certain
informational asymmetries, firm insiders (say corporate managers and
directors) may try to misallocate investment funds on their own behalf.
The financial structure is designed to address the incentive problem.
However, the tax system introduces a tradeoff between optimally in-
sulating the firm against business cycle risk and minimizing the ex-
pected tax burden.
Under a benchmark tax system that treats all kinds of liabilities sym-
metrically, the optimal financial arrangement insulates the lenders from
as much of the idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risk as possible, but has them
share in the aggregate risk. This is in keeping with the arguments pre-
sented in Section III A. The optimal financial arrangement is interpret-
able as a mixture of "debt" and "equity." Effectively, equity serves as a
buffer to business cycle risks; firms may suspend dividend payments in
recessions.
1
5 This arrangement mitigates the impact of a recession on
managerial equity.
Under a tax system that treats debt favorably, firms are induced to
issue a smaller fraction of indexed securities (i.e., equity) and thus to
absorb more business cycle risk than they would choose in the absence
of the distortion. Indeed, if the probability of a recession is sufficiently
low, it may be in a firm's interest ex ante to obtain the tax advantage of a
high debt-equity ratio at the risk of having a quantity of debt that makes
it infeasible to operate in the (ex post) event of a general business down-
turn. In this situation, because of the large quantity of debt being car-
ried, a recession lowers the net asset position of the firm's insiders to the
point where the agency costs are so severe that lenders will no longer
1
5 It is interesting to observe that, while insignificant over the postwar period, equity
issues were an important form of corporate finance prior to the Depression, accounting for
more than 15 percent of funds raised during the 1901-1929 period (Taggart, 1985). It is
possible that greater cyclical movements (common risks) contributed to the increased
reliance on equity finance over that period.58 Gertler & Hubbard
supply credit. The tax system thus encourages the firm to risk the possi-
bility of having a debt-overhang problem in a recession.
1
6
We also consider the implications of permitting the principal obliga-
tion on debt to be renegotiable. Having (costlessly) renegotiable debt
makes debt effectively like equity and thus completely unravels the
effect of the tax distortion. The outcome is exactly equivalent to the case
of symmetric tax treatment of debt and equity.
Two basic questions emerge directly relevant to public policy. First,
how large is the tax subsidy to corporate debt? Second, is debt, particu-
larly the "new" kind of debt, easily renegotiable and thus effectively
"equity in drag." If the latter is true then the only public policy question
is whether the effective reduction in the corporate cost of capital is
desirable. If it is not true, and if the debt subsidy is significant, then it is
conceivable that the tax system is encouraging an overly fragile corpo-
rate structure.
We address these questions in the next two sections. Section IV dis-
cusses the magnitude of the tax subsidy, while Section V takes up the
issue of renegotiation.
IV. THE TAX SUBSIDY TO DEBT
In this section we examine the relative tax treatment of debt versus
equity. A major point we emphasize is that it is important to distinguish
between the incentives provided for using leverage to finance new in-
vestments versus using it to repurchase equity. We also try to evaluate
recent changes in the tax code in this light.
The relative subsidy to debt is a long-standing feature of the U.S. tax
code. It is in part an outcome of the classical system of income taxation
under which the incomes to corporations and to the individuals who
supply them with funds are taxed separately. Under this kind of system,
the effective tax rate on a security depends on its treatment both at the
corporate level and the personal level. There are three important
"wedges." First, corporations may deduct interest paid to bondholders,
but cannot deduct dividends paid to shareholders. Second, individuals
must pay taxes on interest as it accrues, as opposed to when it is actually
received, but they need to pay taxes on income from stocks (dividends
and capital gains) only when it is realized. Third, capital gains have been
historically taxed at rates below those on ordinary income.
1
6 We do not mean to suggest that tax distortions are the only reason financial contracts
may not be properly indexed to aggregates. It is, for example, a longstanding puzzle as to
why debt contracts are not indexed to the price level. Factors such as the inability to find
good indices are probably also important to explaining incomplete indexing.Taxation and Financial Distress 59
With respect to choosing between debt and equity to finance new
investments, it is relevant to compare the total (corporate and individ-
ual) tax burden on each kind of security. The interest deduction at the
corporate level, of course, provides a major tax break for using debt.
Conversely, the low capital gains rate at the personal level works in
favor of equity. In this regard, recent tax changes have had a mixed
effect. The 1981 tax act reduced capital gains along with individual tax
rates (maintaining the level of the corporate tax rate), while the 1986 act
raised them. Specifically, it called for treating realized capital gains as
ordinary income (though preserving the advantage of deferral).
For financing new investment, the subsidy to debt finance is
tc + (1 - tc)% - t
dp,
where ta ^, and fj, represent, respectively, effective tax rates on corpo-
rate income, and equity and debt income at the individual level. The first
two terms represent the taxes paid on returns from an equity-financed
investment; the last reflects the tax paid on a return from a debt-financed
project (untaxed at the corporate level). The effective tax rate on equity
depends on assumptions about the mix of returns between dividends
and capital gains as well as the deferral advantage of capital gains.
The effective corporate tax rate will in general be less than the statu-
tory rate because of the tax-loss carryforwards. Altshuler and Auerbach
(1990) calculate that during the early 1980s, the effective tax rate was
about 32 percent, as opposed to the statutory rate of 46 percent. Gordon
and MacKie-Mason (1989) estimate the effective tax rate to be about 29
percent in 1988, as opposed to the statutory rate of 34 percent. Using
Poterba's (1989) estimate of t
dv, they estimate the tax subsidy to debt
(implied by the expression above) to be 19.9 percent just prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, and 22.4 percent in 1988. Alternatively, using the
effective tax rates on interest and equity-return recipients calculated in
Table 4, the spread between equity and debt tax rates is larger (30.2
percent).
1
7 (Both calculations assume that the effective capital gains rate
is one-fourth of the statutory rate because of the effects of deferral and
stepped-up basis at death; see Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba,
1983.)
The tax considerations involved for deciding to restructure are slightly
different from those for financing new investments. Because in this
instance leverage is being used to repurchase shares, the net tax cost of
1
7 In addition, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which eliminated withholding taxes on
newly issued corporate bonds, provided incentives for foreigners to increase their hold-
ings of U.S. corporate bonds.60 Gertler & Hubbard
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Sources: Tax rates are taken from Tax Analysts (1986). Interest receipts data are from Summers (1989).
Relative ownership of corporate equity in 1988, weighted by the market value of holdings, are obtained
from Flow of Funds data published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
issuing debt depends positively on the effective tax on distributions to
the existing equity holders, who receive capital gains in process. That is,
while a low capital gains rate reduces the subsidy to using debt to
finance new capital investment, at the same time it encourages replacing
existing equity with debt.
Both corporate and individual tax rates declined after the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. In addition, because the statutory capital gains tax rate has
been (relatively) high since 1986, it might appear that tax considerations
provided little incentive for the mass of corporate restructurings that
have occurred since then. On the contrary, even abstracting from defer-
ral advantages, the average effective capital gains tax rate is much lower
than the individual income tax rate. This is because capital gains accrue
in part to institutional and foreign investors paying lower tax rates. For
example, the effective tax rate is zero for pension funds and foreign
investors.
1
8 Moreover, the fraction of equity held by zero-tax investors
1
8 The tax rate is "effectively zero" for pension funds, since taxes are paid ultimately by
beneficiaries, who are able to defer the obligation, and the advantage of deferral is still
quite substantial. Foreign investors also effectively face a zero rate. U.S. capital gains taxes
are not levied on foreigners, and withholding taxes on dividends are low for most inves-
tors from countries with tax treaties with the United States.Taxation and Financial Distress 61
(foreign investors and private and state and local government pension
funds) has grown from 12.1 percent in 1970 to 22.1 percent in 1979 to
27.1 percent in 1988. In summary, since interest payments are deduct-
ible at the corporate rate, there are still tax incentives underlying the
recent switch from debt to equity.
While the tax system encourages the use of leverage, it is unlikely that
tax considerations alone are responsible for the current surge in debt. It
is hard to pinpoint any recent changes in the tax code that could have
promoted a major shift to leverage. A more plausible scenario is that
innovations in the junk bond market described earlier (primarily the
development of the secondary market) opened up the possibility for
corporations to exploit the tax advantage on a much wider scale than
was ever possible before.
1
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V. IS DEBT REALLY DEBT?
As we have emphasized throughout, a critical question is whether junk
bonds are easily renegotiated in the midst of industry-wide or economy-
wide recessions. The claim that junk bonds have the pertinent equity-
like features center on five propositions:
(i) Junk bonds are more closely held than traditional debt, which facili-
tates renegotiation.
(ii) The new instruments have fewer restrictions and covenants than
traditional private placements, which facilitates trade on a second-
ary market.
(iii) Original-issue-discount and payment-in-kind obligations permit the
issuer to skip cash payments in some periods.
(iv) Exchange offers of securities can forestall default and bankruptcy in
periods of financial distress. Further, incentives are strong to com-
plete these transactions because highly leveraged firms are likely to
be valuable ongoing concerns, at least relative to traditional firms in
financial distress.
(v) For reputational considerations, firms like Drexel Burnham Lambert
or KKR have a strong incentive to guarantee liquidity in the market.
We address each of these points in turn.
1
9 Highly leveraged transactions involving unsecured debt have long been common in the
financing of small and medium-sized corporations. Traditionally, such transactions con-
sisted of secured debt (60 percent), equity (10 percent), with the balance handled largely
through private placements with insurance firms. This market was not large enough to
finance large-scale unsecured debt issues necessary to wage war for the control of large
corporations (see Perry and Taggart, 1988).62 Gertler & Hubbard
With respect to the first point, the opposite is probably true; holdings
of junk bonds are more dispersed than holdings of traditional debt,
raising instead of lowering—all other things being equal—the costs of re-
negotiation. Over the past decade, non-financial corporations have
steadily relied less on bank credit and more on funds obtained from
bond markets (e.g., insurance companies, pension funds, and for-
eigners). Bank loans provided 44 percent of debt funds raised by non-
financial corporations in 1979 and only 21 percent in 1988. Corporate
bonds provided just over 25 percent in 1979, and 50 percent in 1988.
Bonds used in highly leveraged transactions have in part replaced
equity, bank loans, and private placements. While traditional debt was
indeed closely held, the same is unlikely to be true for the new debt. The
process of securitizing—critical to the growth of the market—makes
possible widely diffuse holdings; see Bernanke and Campbell (1988) for
related arguments.
Independent studies by Drexel Burnham Lambert and Hirtle (1988) at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York confirm these points. Break-
downs of high-yield debt holdings by investor class are reported in
Table 5. For example, Hirtle estimates that in 1987, 66 percent of junk
bond holdings were in the hands of mutual funds (25 percent), pension
funds (10 percent), and insurance companies (31 percent). The balance
TABLE 5












































Sources: Drexel Burnham Lambert data for 1986 are taken from Report on High Yield Bonds, General
Accounting Office, February 29, 1988. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York data for 1987 are taken
from Hirtle (1988). Drexel Burnham Lambert data (as of December 31, 1988) were reported in David
Zigas and Larry Light, "Don't Put Away the Smelling Salts Yet," Business Week, October 2,1989, pp. 92-
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was distributed among individuals (10 percent), savings and loan in-
stitutions (6 percent), and other investors (including foreign investors
and domestic corporations—18 percent). Further, in addition to compli-
cations introduced by dispersion of ownership, "prudent man" rules
(under ERISA) governing pension funds and institutions managing pen-
sion accounts (see Warshawsky, 1988) may restrict the ability of many
institutions to renegotiate.
With respect to the second point, it is no longer true that high-yield
debt avoids the restrictions common in traditional private placements.
For example, First Boston Corporation (1989, p. 35) reports:
. . . the market appears to be coming full circle, back toward the stringent
indenture packages of the private placement market. While earlier issues of public
high yield securities found that they could trade the liquidity of the public high
yield market for the tighter indentures demanded in the private market, many of
the more recent issues include covenant packages rivaling those provided in the
private market.
Specifically, the First Boston study notes that as late as 1986, most major
deals contained no restrictions on additional debt; by 1987, the major
issues reviewed all contained varying degrees of protection against in-
cremental borrowing, thus impeding the ability to renegotiate. This pat-
tern is expected to continue. Other relevant restrictions related to
changes in corporate control ("poison puts"), requirements of net worth
maintenance, and limitations on certain payments, mergers and consoli-
dations, and asset sales.
The recent issue of senior subordinated notes by Playtex (due Decem-
ber 15, 1988) well illustrates the new restrictions. Though the firm is
credited with having a stable market position and consistent operating
earnings, Moody's assigned the issue a B2 rating out of concern over
interest coverage. The Moody's review indicated a number of covenants
relating to changes in control, limitations on debt and dividend pay-
ments, and net worth maintenance (Moody's Bond Survey, December 19,
1988, pp. 4212-14). The review also expressed concern about the possi-
ble effects of leverage on future invstment decisions:
. . . A significant risk for Playtex is that it may not have the financial strength to
support the marketing and manufacturing programs necessary to build higher
sales volume, (p. 4213)
The third point pertains to the newly introduced debt instruments
which permit corporations some flexibility in meeting their interest obli-64 Gertler & Hubbard
gations. There are several kinds. "Original issue discount" bonds defer
either all ("zerofix") or part ("split coupon") of the interest payments
until maturity. These bonds are growing in popularity: fully 25 percent
of new high yield issues in 1988 were original issue discount bonds, and
they accounted for 14.4 percent of the stock of high-yield debt and 6
percent of total outstanding corporate debt obligations (First Boston Cor-
poration, 1989, p. 23). "Payment in kind" (PIK) obligations allow the
issuer to pay interest in cash or in additional securities (which would be
valued at par). These kinds of contracts permit the firm to defer cash
payments in periods of distress.
Like equity, these new instruments permit corporations to overcome
temporary liquidity problems. However, unlike equity, they do not al-
low firms to share the risks of systemic disturbances with outside lend-
ers. Both types of instruments, as well as traditional debt, meet the
"sum certain" requirement imposed by the IRS. That is, while they
permit deferral of interest, they do not allow for costless adjustment of
the principal obligation. Thus, they do not permit the kind of indexing
necessary to insulate corporations from systemic risks (as described in
Section IIIA).
One recent illustration of this point relates to the securities issued in
the 1987 purchase of SCI TV by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts. The ac-
cumulating debt—as cash interest payments are omitted by the finan-
cially strapped deal—will grow from $200 million in PIKs in October
1987 to $310 million in October 1990. The result according to one invest-
ment manager: "You have a 5-pound bag and 10 pounds of garbage"
(see "How KKR Stubbed Its Toe," Business Week, August 7, 1989, p. 56).
Other examples have emerged recently, as well.
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It is worth emphasizing that the IRS appears determined to prevent
firms from simply relabeling equity as debt; in particular, it has taken
the sum certain requirement seriously. For example, in 1982, Goldman
Sachs attempted to introduce Adjustable Rate Convertible Notes, which
allowed for variable payments to bondholders (based on explicit contin-
2
0 Concern has been expressed that PIK bonds do not adjust the principal obligations. For
example:
The wide interest in troubled businesses comes as many companies that loaded up on tax-favored debt
capital in recent years are ruing their boundless optimism. Even when a company's income did not
justify the debt load, Wall Street's financial engineers often found ways of deferring the out-of-pocket
costs.
Known as pay-in-kind securities, increasing-rate notes, or zero-coupon bonds, these exotic inven-
tions cleverly conserve cash in a deal's early years. But the borrower faces a balloon payment on a
future day of reckoning. (In Alison Leigh Cowan, "Rescuing businesses is now a big business,"
New York Times, October 5, 1989.)Taxation and Financial Distress 65
TABLE 6
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Source: Tabulations are based on the study of original-issue high-yield bonds in Asquith, Mullins, and
Wolff (1989, Tables, 2, 6, and 7). Cumulative percentages are through December 31,1988. Defaults refer
to bankruptcy filing, formal declaration by the trustee of a bond, or a missed coupon payment. Ex-
change offers do not include security transactions after default or bankruptcy.
gencies). However, the IRS disallowed the contracts in 1983 for failing to
meet the sum certain principle.
Regarding point four, "exchange offers" of securities—the typical
mechanism for out-of-bankruptcy renegotiation—are problematic with
multiple creditor interests. Such offers are voluntary, raising a "free-
rider" problem: debtholders not participating in the exchange of securi-
ties may see the market value of their securities subsequently rise,
lowering the desire of a given debtholder to participate.
Moreover, historically, completed exchange offers have not provided
sufficient breathing room for distressed companies to rebound (First
Boston Corporation, 1988, pp. 35-36; 1989, p. 46), and investors have
experienced similar losses in distressed exchange offers as in defaults
(Asquith, Mullins, and Wolff, 1989). These losses have over the past
decade averaged 50.05 percent of principal (First Boston Corporation,
1989, p. 45). Table 6, which uses tabulations from Asquith, Mullins, and
Wolff (1989), shows that while exchange offers are not infrequently
used, their ability to avoid default is rare.
Another consideration is that the availability of renegotiation under
Chapter 11 may provide firms with an attractive alternative to out-of-
bankruptcy renegotiation. Under Chapter 11, equity holders and man-
agers have a more significant claim on the enterprise than they would,
say, in liquidation. Further, the uniform voting (by creditors) required66 Gertler & Hubbard
under Chapter 11 avoids many of the free-rider problems associated
with voluntary renegotiation. Out-of-bankruptcy arrangements are not
a perfect substitute here, because only Chapter 11 procedures avoid the
tendency for bilateral renegotiations. Nor are formal covenants in (pub-
licly issued) bonds. The Trust Indenture Act forbids the inclusion of
voting procedures for bondholders to adjust principal and/or interest
payments (see Jackson, 1986; or Roe, 1987, for a discussion). Hence, in
periods of distress both debtors and creditors may prefer filing for Chap-
ter 11 to voluntary renegotiation; this sentiment is echoed in First Boston
Corporation (1989, p. 43).
It is probably true that incentives to complete exchange offers are
stronger for highly leveraged firms than for traditional firms, since the
value of the underlying assets in the wake of default or bankruptcy is
likely to be greater, holding everything else constant. Nonetheless, the
weight of (informal) evidence suggests that the frictions owing to the
free-rider and institutional considerations mentioned above remain
present in the exchange offer process. It is probably also still the case
that equity or closely held debt provides better insulation against com-
mon risks.
Finally, is it the case that the investment banks and deal makers that
have a major stake in the ongoing use of junk bonds will actively inter-
vene to ensure the smooth functioning of the market? Indeed, to date,
investment banks such as Drexel Burnham Lambert have played an
important role in providing the needed liquidity by actively participating
in the secondary market. In our view, these private institutions can
perform "lender of last resort" functions when defaults (or near de-
faults) are relatively isolated incidents. However, it is unlikely that they
have the resources to intervene in the midst of a wave of defaults owing
to some kind of systemic disturbance. Indeed, the popular perception is
that the liquidity of the junk bond market has been drying up as the
frequency of defaults has been rising.
2
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VI. THE AGENDA FOR TAX REFORM
We now consider possible reforms which would mitigate the impact of
the tax system on corporate capital structure (see also Auerbach, 1989).
One possibility is complete integration of corporate and individual
income taxes; this would, of course, eliminate the need to define debt
and equity for tax purposes. It would, however, also entail windfalls to
2
1 See, for example, Anise C. Wallace, "Time for jitters in the junk bond market/' New York
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existing equityholders, and eliminate any revenue from investments by
foreign shareholders and domestic tax-exempt shareholders. Another
possibility is to remove the tax deductibility of interest, which would
place debt and equity on a more equal footing. This action, however,
would raise the cost of capital to corporations; and it would also confer
an advantage on foreign investors in the market for corporate control in
the U.S. The latter is true because foreign investors avoid capital gains
taxes in the U.S. and may not pay taxes on their U.S. income in their
home country (if they are subject to a territorial tax system).
To the extent that corporate-level taxes on capital income are to be
maintained, a corporate cash-flow tax provides an alternative way to
minimize the differential treatment of debt and equity.
2
2 Abstracting
from the tax treatment of financial institutions, the tax base would be the
difference between gross income (receipts less costs of goods sold) and
investment expenses. That is, depreciation deductions are replaced by
expensing investment, and interest deductions are removed. There is
thus no marginal effect of corporate taxation on investment decisions.
Nor is there any distinction between returns to existing and new equity,
since the tax is effectively on distributions less new equity issues.
The corporate cash-flow tax does not, however, remove all distinc-
tions between debt and equity for tax purposes (see the discussion in
Auerbach, 1989). In principle, since the cash-flow tax imposes a zero
marginal tax on both debt and equity, the marginal effects of the tax are
akin to those of a true income tax in which there are deductions for real
returns to both debt and equity. Taking corporate and individual levels
of taxation into account, equity returns would have a lower effective tax
rate than debt under a cash-flow tax, since interest payments would
continue to be taxable for individuals. The transition problems associ-
ated with converting to a cash-flow tax are also significant (see the
discussion in King, 1986).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Assessing whether corporate leverage is "too high" requires some kind
of metric. We propose one, using an approach that stresses the role of
financial contracts in aligning managerial incentives. We argue that,
when common as well as idiosyncratic disturbances are important to
firm profitability, the optimal financial arrangement involves a mixture
of debt and equity. The arrangement is also equivalent to one with debt
2
2 See, for example, Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978), King (1986), Feldstein (1989), and
Hubbard (1989).68 Gertler & Hubbard
that has provisions allowing for adjustment of the principal in response
to industry-wide or economy-wide disturbances. The idea is to have
outside lenders share the systemic risks in order to insure the firm's
financial position, and therefore its creditworthiness, against fluctua-
tions in general business conditions. Our measure of excessive leverage
is therefore (roughly speaking) a measure of the degree to which
financial contracts are not optimally indexed to cyclical disturbances.
In this regard, distortions contributed by the tax system may be an
important factor in creating a situation of excessive leverage. The point
is somewhat more subtle than the usual argument that the relative tax
subsidy increases the level of debt, thereby increasing the risk of default.
The traditional literature, we think, misses the significance of the dis-
tinction between idiosyncratic and common risks. As stressed earlier,
when only firm-specific risks are important, it is conceivable that pure
debt financing is desirable, despite the possibility of costly default and
independent of tax considerations. Once common risks are present,
however, the tax system introduces a tension. In particular, the au-
thorities who define debt for tax purposes make difficult the kind of
indexing provisions desirable for insuring against common risks. This
introduces an important tradeoff in the capital structure decision—the
benefits from additional debt of the expected tax subsidy versus the
costs of having reduced flexibility in adjusting obligations to creditors in
the event of an industry-wide or economy-wide recession. We argue
further that because junk bonds are costly to renegotiate in practice, it is
unlikely that optimal indexing is implicitly present.
We are left with some clear but difficult policy choices. An important
problem with the current system is that it seeks to classify particular
forms of financial contracts for tax purposes, and thereby interferes with
the efficient choice of capital structure. Integrating corporate and indi-
vidual tax systems or instituting a corporate cash flow tax may be desir-
able because either avoids the need for this kind of classification, and
therefore mitigates the distortion. However, instituting such reforms
also requires addressing possible revenue considerations and problems
of transition. Nonetheless, discussions of these issues should figure
prominently in the debate over corporate leverage.
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